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1.0 lntroduction 
Today's risk perception and communication scholars embrace the challenges 
associated with seeking to understand audiences as active participants in the risk 
communication process. Gone, thankfully, are the days when both researchers 
and practitioners assumed that one need only invest in the careful construction 
of messages, in order to educate or persuade. During those na·ive decades, 
unsuccessful outcomes-and there were many-were simply blamed on the 
audience. Today, we realize that one can achieve a reasonable fit between message 
and outcome only by coming to grips with the judgments that audiences make, 
about both messages and the channels that disseminate them, and then by 
aligning our communication efforts accordingly. 
Crucial to a good fit between message and audience, is therefore an 
understanding of audience members' information,seeking and processing 
behaviors. Risk messages can be informative, and otherwise effective, only when 
audiences intercept them and encocle them in sorne way. Yet, studies of the effects 
of risk messages have, historically, treated seeking and processing as 'black box' 
attributes of audiences, as indecipherable way stations along the route to some 
kind of message impact. Recent work in psychology and in communica tion 
science has unearthed substantial variance in the extent to which individuals 
look for, and then analyze, information. That variance, in turn, can have a 
profound influence on how a person reacts toa risk message . 
We think it important, as a result, to pull information seeking and processing 
out of the black box and into a well, lit environment, where risk communication 
scholars can explore both precursors and outcomes. The coauthors have devoted 
intellectual effort to this over the years, including the development of the Risk 
lnformation Seeking and Processing (RISP) model (Griffin et al. 1999; Griffi.n et 
al., 2013 ), to which we will refer later in this chapter. 
Of the two concepts-information seeking and information processi~g-it is 
the second that h as received the lion's share of attention from researchers. In 
psychology, dual,process theories, such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model , the 
Heuristic,Systematic Model, and Cognitive, Experiential Self, Theory, all seek to 
better understand what leads individuals to engage in more or less effortful 
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processing of information (for a comprehensive look at these and other dual 
process theories, see Chaiken & Trope, 1999). Equally important has been the 
work on decision,making in the face of uncertainty, pioneered by Kahneman and 
Tversky (sorne of this early scholarship is gathered in Kahneman, Slovic & 
T versky, 1982), which explores the use of heuristic processing strategies. 
Less well understood, however, is the impact of information seeking on the 
success or failure of risk messages. While the activity of seeking information is 
viewed by many scholars as a component of processing, we argue here that 
information seeking can be treated fruitfully as a separare concept, driven by 
various motivations, feelings of efficacy, and beliefs about the relevance and 
availability of information channels in one's environment. 
Thus, we ha ve chosen in this chapter to concentra te on risk information seeking. 
W e will first define what we mean by the term, then will tum to an arra y of 
conceptual models that explore predictors of individuals' decisions to seek 
information, more or less actively. Prominent among those predictors are beliefs 
about information channels, so a focus on these beliefs will constitute another 
major segment of this chapter. We will finally forge linkages between these concepts 
and risk information, with a particular focus on the RISP model mentioned earlier. 
2.0 lnformation seeking 
Wilson describes information seeking as 'the purposive seeking for information as 
a consequence of a need to satisfy sorne goal' (Wilson, 2000: 49). However, since 
we include passive behavior in our conceptualization, we rema in equivoca! about 
the crucial nature of 'purposive', at least as a stable characteristic. lnstead, we 
argue that one can situare information seeking along a couple of continuums: lt 
can be more or less active, as well as more or less purposive. lnclusion of mediated 
information channels, in particular, invites attention to more passive seeking. 
Many of us live in rich, mediated environments, and individuals inhabiting such 
a landscape can allow information to wash over them as they engage in, at best, 
only sporadic bouts of attention, episodes that are more reactive than purposive. 
Television has fashioned itself into the ideal channel for this kind of immersion. 
Conversely, someone may look for information in a much more purposive and 
active way, even setting asid e normal tasks to devore time to unearthing relevant 
bits of evidence, sometimes from channels not normally employed. The Internet 
is growing as a channel of choice for these individuals. 
Avoidance is another dimension of information seeking, and, although it is by 
definition purposive, it, too, can be practiced in more or less active fashion. In 
that information,rich environment of ours, moving one's eyes off screen, as we sit 
in front of the television on the typical evening, serves as a form of less active 
avoidance. On the other hand, an individual confronted with a grim health 
diagnosis may actively choose to avoid additional information about the disease, 
feeling such detailed knowledge may be more harmful than helpful. 
An example of active avoidance in the face of risk was uncovered years ago by 
British sociologist Brian Wynne, whose study of workers at a nuclear fuels 
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reprocessing plant in northem England found that sorne individuals expressed 
little interest in learning about the possible risks of their work environment. 
Appareritly, ignorance helped keep in check the angst that might arise from a 
more thorough knowledge of those risks (Wynne, 1992). 
Models of information seeking, developed by both communication and 
information science scholars, share a few basic characteristics. They include the 
importance of uncertainty (Berger & Calabrese, 1975; Miller & Jablin, 1991), 
and of social factors (e.g. Chaffee & McLeod, 1973 ), as motivators of information 
seeking. Another is a focus on the motives and behaviors of information users, 
rather rhan on the decisions and actions of providers (Kuhlrhau, 1991). For 
example, Dervin's Sense~Making theory engages scholars in something of a 
mental models approach ro users, in order to glimpse information~seeking 
processes in action (Dervin & Nilan, 1986). 
Given a high uncertainty environment and a focus on understanding the 
information user, what then influences the nature and intensity of information 
seeking about risks? One can imagine a number of answers ro that question, but 
for purposes of this chapter we propose three interrelated factors: motivation, 
capacity, and channel beliefs (Griffin et al., 1999) Motivation refers to the 
processes that spur a person toward or away from a behavior; in this case, seeking 
( or avoiding) risk~related information. Capacity refers to information gathering 
selrefficacy, a person's assessment of their own personal ability to find and utilize 
information. 'Channel beliefs' refers ro a varied category of beliefs about 
information channels themselves that may move a person to look for information 
in some types of channels rather than others. We turn to those three arenas 
below, concentrating primarily on channel beliefs, while reflecting on some of 
the ways that motivation and capacity might relate ro these beliefs. 
3.0 Channel beliefs 
Channel beliefs are the mix of cognitive and affective ways in which people assess 
information channels, typically with respect to the expected outcomes for 
themselves or others of using those channels for risk~related information. We 
expect rhese beliefs to moderare individuals' seeking styles, including decisions to 
avoid information. 
3.1 What is a channel? 
1t is important here ro distinguish 'channel' from 'source', as these terms are 
sometimes employed (erroneously, we would argue) as synonyms in srudies. 
While the two terms refer occasionally to the same entity ( i.e., an interpersonal 
channel may be an individual, such as an expert, who is actually the source of 
information about a risk), they more often refer to conceptually distinct ones. A 
channel is a conveyance device rhat collects information from a source or sources, 
repackages it and then disseminates it. Those functions lead scholars to refer to 
such channels as 'mediated' ones; that is, the channel acts as something of a 
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'go~between' between source and audience. Mediated channels rarely transmit 
without first repackaging information; in fact, primary goals of mediated channels 
are to be highly selective in choosing information, and then to embed the selected 
information in narratives that seek to summarize, analyze orbe persuasive about 
the events or processes of interest. 
For research purposes, channels are typically categorized dichotomously as 
mediated or interpersonal. Common mediated channels include newspapers, 
radio, television and magazines, while common interpersonal channels include 
friends, neighbors, and individuals with specific areas of expertise. Although 
interpersonal channels can affect a merger of channel and source characteristics, 
as noted above, even those channels engage in 'mediation' almost as much as 
traditional journalistic channels. Consider your physician, who provides 
treatment recommendations for your various aches and pains. Those 
recommendations may stem not from the physician's own research but instead, 
from reading the research of others, or from learning of new drug options from 
manufacturers' representatives. Y our physician is passing on packets of information 
from sources in ways not unlike the narratives of more traditional mediated 
channels. 
Scholars are struggling, at present, to fit new communication channels into 
these two conceptual categories. At times, those channels seem to serve a 
straightforward, mediated function; an Internet search for information about the 
risks of asbestos, for example, may tum up sites brimming with govemment fact 
sheets. Altematively, other options such as Facebook, listservs, blogs or chat rooms 
offer interactive access to what appear to be individual opinions. We know that the 
Internet has become our preferred channel when we need to search for science or 
risk information (National Science Board, 2012). But we are only beginning to 
understand the beliefs that individuals hold about these channels, beliefs that will 
drive their openness to and interpretations of information found there. 
3.2 Why focus on channel rather than source beliefs? 
Persuasion research has historically privileged studies of perceived source and 
message characteristics (see, for example, Perloff, 2003 ), rather than studies of 
channel perceptions. But an understanding of decision~making suggests 
increasingly that individuals make judgments about the credibility of information 
less on the basis of the sources embedded in a message, and more on the basis of 
the channel that carries that information (Flanagin & Metzger, 2000; Bates et al., 
2006). This would be consistent with the argument that humans are fundamentally 
heuristic information processors ( e.g. Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), that we take 
shortcuts whenever we can. Judging the credibility of a channel, frankly, is a lot 
easier than the effort required toread narratives carefully, in order to sift through 
and evaluare the sources cited there. 
People hold many beliefs about information channels, with sorne of those 
heliefs more idiosyncratic than others. Below, we mention scholarly explorations 
of a number of the more systematic belief categories, and their origins in 
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individuals' capacities to seek information, their motivations to do so, and the 
mixture of these factors. 
4.0 Capacity and channel satisficing 
It may seem a matter of common sense to say that one major predictor of channel 
use is a person's judgment that a channel can, in fact, provide the information 
needed. But our environment is replete with instances of people opting into 
channels that they judge to offer inferior information. For example, while 
individuals describe physicians as the ideal channel for health information, they 
get the bulk of their health information not from doctors but from mediated 
channels, including the Internet (Johnson & Meischke, 1991; Hesse et al., 2005). 
Chaffee ( 1986) offered an explanation sorne years ago for this pattern. Channel 
choices result from juggling two evaluative perceptions: ( 1) the likelihood that a 
channel will contain information relevant to your need; and (2) the cost of 
accessing that channel. Sometimes channels are literally too expensive in dollar, 
and,cents terms; for example, the cost of a subscription toa hard copy of the daily 
New York Times, arguably the most prestigious newspaper in the United States, is 
beyond the means of many Americans. But channels can also be costly in terms 
of time and effort. If a person seeking to follow up on information about a risk 
does not know whom to contact, the time required to clarify that source may be 
too great. And while the likelihood of finding relevant information in a channel 
is clearly an important factor, cost willlikely trump relevance every time. 
In the case of health information, this pattem is clear. Although most people 
would prefer to talk toa physician when they have a health question, that channel 
is costly to access, at least in the United States, where pa tients are billed for 
health care, and where physicians are often sequestered within organizations that 
guard their time. As a result, individuals default to more accessible channels such 
as TV and magazines, even though they regard those channels as less likely to 
contain information relevant to their needs. 
Thus, in addition to channel beliefs, individuals seem to bring to information 
seeking a set ofbeliefs about their own levels of efficacy when it comes to accessing 
and evaluating risk information; beliefs that will influence their assessment of the 
costs of potencial channels. For many people, these efficacy levels may be quite 
low. After a number of studies of public efforts to build knowledge about science 
and risk issues, British sociologist Brian Wynne noted: 
An important discovery from our research has been the enormous amount of 
sheer effort needed for members of the public to monitor sources of scientific 
information, judge between them, keep up with shifting scientitic 
understandings, distinguish consensus from isolated scientific opinion, and 
decide how expert knowledge needs qualifying for use in their particular 
situation. They must also judge what level of knowledge is good enough for 
them [italics in the original]. 
(Wynne, 1991: 117) 
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Wynne was talking about both information seeking and processing, of course, but 
the daunting requirements of finding potentially relevant channels, and then 
assessing their quality, may simply defeat many individuals. The Internet places 
literally thousands of channel options at the doorstep of an inquiry, but while 
that may seem to sol ve the access problem, it multiplies the assessment challenges. 
Evidence suggests that many people respond to that channel largesse by 
abandoning channel credibility evaluations altogether (Flanagin & Metzger, 
2000; Bates et al., 2006). Even the perception of access may be something of a 
false promise; an inability to search effectively, combined with websites designed 
with users other than the public in mind, means that many individuals step away 
from Internet searches in frustration (Lankes, 2008). 
5.0 Motivations, expectations, values 
The motivations that drive people to seek, avoid, or use information have been 
explored by various scholars over the years. Among cognitive motivators, the 
drive to manage and overcome uncertainty-usually considered to be an 
unpleasant state of mind-is a key factor (e.g. Berger & Calabrese, 1975). Related 
to this drive is a person's desire for judgmental confidence, and information 
sufficiency for topics that are salient, and with which they may need to cope 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). This need for information sufficiency can motivare 
information seeking as well as processing, in regard to health or environmental 
risks (Griffin et al., 1999). Affective motivations can also influence information 
seeking or avoidance. For example, citizens' anger at risk management agencies 
has been associated with active information seeking and processing of information 
about a flooding problem (Griffin et al., 2008). In addition, people might avoid 
information that could arouse fear of a health risk-another unpleasant state of 
mind-if they feel that there is little or nothing they can do about the threat 
(Witte, 1994 ). 
Outside of various cognitive and affective drivers, other factors that motívate 
people to seek and use information have origins in our relationships with others. 
For example, people might seek, select and use information in preparation for 
discussing a topic with others (Atkin, 1972), ro defend and support their 
viewpoints, or to manage the impressions they convey to others ( Chaiken et al., 
1996). People might also seek and process information because of perceived social 
norms. For example, individuals might believe that others expect them to know 
about a given risk, or that other people similar to them know about a risk and so 
they should, too ( Griffin et al., 1999; Griffin et al., 2013). 
5.1 Uses and gratifications 
When people choose channels to help them meet such informational needs, they 
often rely on their beliefs about the various channels, in particular what they 
expect the content of the channels to offer them (Katz et al., 1974). In the field 
of mass communication research, a fairly large literature has developed under the 
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'uses and gratifications' label, to explore people's tendency to select channels and 
messages that fi.t specific and often situational needs. In this framework, 
commurtication behavior is assumed to be largely goal~directed and purposive, 
although scholars acknowledge that the degree of initiative or activity varies 
from person to person, and from situation to situation (Ruggiero, 2000). 
Researchers have developed typologies of communication motives-for example, 
the need for surveillance versus the need for diversion-and find that individuals 
often opt into different channels to satisfy these different needs. Individuals will 
seek to satisfy a surveillance motive by attending toa channel that delivers news 
(newspapers, news programming on radio or television, Internet news sites), 
while a need for diversion may lead them to channels where entertainment 
programming domina tes (for a reasonably current loo k at the uses and gratifications 
arena, see Papacharissi, 2009; Rubín, 2002). 
Slater (2007) argues that the process of selecting channels to satisfy particular 
needs activa tes feedback loops, that he calls 'reinforcing spirals'. These loops 
mean that gratifications obtained at one point can reinforce subsequent channel 
selections; a process that Slater suggests helps to construct and then mainta in 
stable patterns of channel use. A similar process was identified by Palmgreen and 
Rayburn (1985), whose expectancy~value model proposes that the gratifications 
people obtain--or not-from media consumption have a learning and feedback 
effect, on the beliefs about expected outcomes that individuals bring to subsequent 
channel choices. 
5.2 Expectancies and values 
According to expectancy~value theory (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), a person's 
attitude toward performing a given behavior (AAct) is essentially based on two 
elements: ( 1) one's beliefs--or expectations-that performing the behavior will 
result in a set of specific outcomes ( each outcome measured on a scale of the 
perceived likelihood of its occurrence); and (2) the value the person puts on each 
outcome (on a good~bad scale). Each outcome belief is multiplied by its respective 
evaluation, such that higher scores represent expectations that a good outcome is 
likely ora bad outcome unlikely, while lower scores represent the opposite. The 
product terms are then summed to produce a composite measure of behaviora l 
beliefs. These beliefs predict AAct, which according to the Theory of Planned 
Behavior (TPB; Ajzen, 2005), is one of three factors-along with perceived 
behavioral control (self~effi.cacy) and subjective norms (perceived social norms)-
that predict the intention to perform the behavior and, ultimately, the behavior 
itself. TPB has been supported in a myriad of studies (see, for example, Armi tage 
& Conner, 2001; Topa & Moriano, 2010), including those applying at least part 
of TPB to information~seeking behaviors ( e.g. Rayburn & Palmgreen, 1984; 
Kahlor, 2007), but has been criticized for excluding affect as a predictor of 
behavior. 
Using a uses and gratifications perspective, Palmgreen & Rayburn (1 985 ) 
extended Fishbein & Ajzen's (1975) expectancy~value formulation to a model 
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designed to predict information seeking and avoidance as behaviors. They 
proposed that individuals seek specifi.c gratifications from given channels or 
content. Ultimately, people base their choice of channels and content on: ( 1) 
their beliefs (expectations) that the medium or content has a particular attribute 
relevant to their needs, or sorne characteristic that will produce a particular 
outcome for them; and ( 2) an affective evaluation of the attribute or outcome. 
For example, outcome beliefs related to television news viewing can include the 
expectancy that attending to the TV news will allow one to keep up with current 
events, or provide something to talk about with other people. Beliefs about 
attributes can include the perceptions that the news is trustworthy or dramatic 
(Rayburn & Palmgreen, 1984 ). The beliefs themselves are formed from personal 
observation and experience (including the outcomes from past use of various 
channels and content), from information gathered from others, and by inference. 
The combination of one's expectations and evaluations can lead people to various 
patterns of seeking or avoiding a given channel and its content actively or 
passively, and to searches for alternatives (Palmgreen & Raybum, 1985). 
5.3 Normative expectations 
McLeod and colleagues argue that individuals' values help construct expectations 
about channels. Specifically, they posit that judgments of how the world works 
(worldviews), about what societal values should be pursued (i.e., materialism, 
postmaterialism), and about what normative roles the news media should play all 
figure into channel choices. One study found, consonant with expectation, that 
individuals who felt that mass media facilitare a pluralistic society were more 
likely to opt into channels that emphasized public affairs information. Those who 
saw the media as agents of social control and conformity, on the other hand, 
sought channels that provided more entertainment content (McLeod et al., 
1998). 
5.4 Self vs. others 
A final source of channel beliefs stems from audience judgments that channels 
vary in the expected relevance of their information for us personally, vis,a,vis 
others. Put another way, when it comes to evaluating risks to ourselves, we get 
picky about information channels that we judge to be relevant to the task at 
hand. 
Much research in psychology and risk perception has established the tendency 
for individuals to perceive themselves as different from everyone else. When it 
comes to risk, we routinely judge ourselves to be more immune to harm. For 
example, we believe that we are better drivers than everyone else, so would be less 
likely to be hurt in an auto accident. While we readily perceive others to be 
adversely affected by hard economic times, we believe ourselves to be relatively 
untouched. In the face of a flu epidemic, we think everyone else desperately needs 
a vaccine shot, but declare our good health to be protection enough from 
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infection. Psychologist Neil Weinstein has labeled this tendency 'unrealistic 
optimism' (Weinstein, 1989), and argues that it constitutes a ubiquitous gap 
between' perceptions of 'self and 'other'. In one recent study, a group of 
neuroscientists used fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) to explore 
this difference physiologically, and found that individuals 'updated their beliefs 
more in response to information that was better than expected than to information 
that was worse' (Sharot et al., 2011: 1475). In other words, we are quick to see 
positive information as relevant to self, but resist seeing negative information as 
equally relevant. 
lndividuals also expect different outcomes of channel exposure by referent. 
Third~person effect researchers repeatedly find that individua ls see themselves as 
more immune to information effects than others; that other people are more 
influenced than are they themselves (Davison, 1983; Paul, Salwen & Dupagne, 
2000). They view others as more malleable, more persuadable by narratives 
(Perloff, 1993 ). However, sorne individuals may still respond in sorne way to a 
message beca use they believe that others will be affected by it (Davison, 1983). 
lt should be no surprise to the reader, then, to learn that the 'me/other' 
distinction also comes into play when we choose information channels. Political 
scientist Diana Mutz calls the phenomenon the 'impersonal influence' hypothesis, 
as it leads us to view sorne channels as more relevant to others than to us personal! y 
(Mutz, 1998). Specifically, we regard information in mediated channels as being 
about others, and resist seeing such information as informing our own personal 
situations. If we need to seek channels to inform our personal risk decisions, we 
want to talk to someone; that is, we regard interpersonal channels as far more 
likely to contain risk information relevant to self. Other scholars have found 
similar patterns in individuals' choices of channels for health and risk information 
(Dunwoody & Neuwirth, 1991; O'Keefe et al., 1998; Griffm et al., 2000). 
This leads individuals to employ mediated stories about risk as a means of 
learning about a risk in a general way, andas a means of assessing the climate of 
opinion regarding that risk. But, unusual circumstances aside, media risk stories 
have only modest impact on individuals' personal risk judgments. 
6.0 Channel beliefs and RISP 
How, then, might individuals' beliefs about channels of risk information, their 
sense of their personal capacity for accessing and using these channels, and their 
motivations to do so combine to affect their seeking of risk information ? One 
approach that incorporares these concepts is the model of Risk lnformation 
Seeking and Processing (RISP). 
In its original formulation (Griffin et al., 1999), the RISP model proposed that 
the ways individuals come to seek (or avoid) and process risk information 
(systematically or heuristically) are affected most directly by interactions of three 
proximate predictors: (1) motivation, based primarily on the drive to obtain and 
understand sufficient information about a risk so as to cope with it in life (based 
on the Heuristic,Systematic Model of Eagly & Chaiken, 1993 ); (2) one's ability 
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to seek and process this information (based on Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, and 
Ajzen, 2005); and (3) relevant beliefs that individuals hold about channels of risk 
information (based initially on Kosicki and McLeod, 1990). Secondary predictors 
were also included in the model, such as individuals' affective responses to a risk 
and informational subjective norms (an application of Ajzen's, 2005, subjective 
norms variable), both of which were expected to affect motivation. Informational 
subjective norms are an individual's perception of social pressures and norms, 
related to gathering or avoiding information about a risk. 
RISP also propases that an individual's affective responses ( e.g. worry, anger) 
will be based on combinations of a set of perceived characteristics of the hazard, 
primarily risk perception ( the subjective probability of being affected by the risk 
combined with its perceived seriousness), one's self,efficacy in dealing with the 
risk, and one's trust in organizations to deal with the risk. One's experience with 
the risk and various other individual characteristics are also included. Subsequent 
tests of the model have added perceived attributions of responsibility for the risk 
to the set of perceived hazard characteristics (Griffin et al., 2008; also see Kahlor, 
Dunwoody & Griffm, 2002). 
A review (Griffin et al., 2013) of the performance of the RISP model's 
proximate predictors across various studies found that motivations and capacity 
have performed reasonably well in their hypothesized, main effect relationships 
with risk information seeking and processing. An inconsistent performer, 
however, has been channel beliefs. 
In the relatively few studies using the RISP model that have employed channel 
beliefs, two dimensions of these beliefs ha ve emerged fairly consistently: ( 1) the 
extent to which the channels are perceived as biased and sensationalizing; and (2) 
the extent to which the channels are seen as providing the users with cues, to assist 
the evaluation and processing of the information they contain. Analyses show that 
the first dimension, perceived bias and sensationalism, tends to bear no direct 
relationship with risk information seeking or processing. The second dimension, 
the perceived presence of validity cues, does relate to both systematic processing of 
risk information and, albeit somewhat weakly, to active seeking. In other words, 
the perceived characteristics of sorne channels ( e.g. channel attributes that facilita te 
one's comparison of information across channels, or that help a person to find 
pattems in facts or events) may be attractive to sorne individuals, and may catalyze 
both channel choices and deeper processing. Reflecting on the Palmgreen & 
Raybum (1985) expectancy,value formulation, these channel beliefs were 
operationalized as beliefs about the attributes of channels, but not as beliefs about 
the outcomes for the self of using these channels. In addition, the studies in volved 
did not ask the respondents to evaluare the perceived attributes. 
Among the Griffin et al. ( 2013) suggestions for further research are examinations 
of: ( 1) the role of other motivations, especially informational subjective norms, 
as both direct and indirect drivers of seeking and processing risk information; and 
(2) the conceptualization and operationalization of channel beliefs in studies of 
risk informar ion seeking and processing. They found that tests of the model ha ve, 
generally, not examined the interactions among motivations, capacity, and 
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channel beliefs. lt is likely rhat channel beliefs, in particular, work best in 
combination with motivations and capacity, ro affect risk information seeking 
and prot'essing, rather than as main effect predictors. In addition, operationalizing 
channel beliefs in an expectancy,value formar might strengthen their conceptual 
and empirical roles, in studies of risk information seeking and processing. As this 
review has suggested, these interactions beg for examination. 
7.0 In Conclusion 
When a risk becomes salient ro an individual, a wide variety of factors will 
influence that person's information seeking behavior. An important component 
of such seeking will be the individual's choice of channel, as research suggests 
that lay audiences often deem channel evaluations to be 'good enough' arbiters of 
information quality. Although people are generally willing ro invest sorne effort 
in attaining a good fir between available channels and their informational needs, 
a number of factors mediare against success. Among them: 
• Channel costs-price, time, effort-may be too high, making sorne channels 
inaccessible. 
• An individual's perceived capacity to seek ( i.e., l don't know how to surf the 
World Wide Web) may limit rhe use of even accessible channels. 
• The normative expectations people have of channels (i.e., media messages 
tell me something about the world at large, bur not about me personally) may 
lead individuals ro devalue risk information in sorne channels and overvalue 
information in other channels. 
W ork with our RISP model suggests-consonant with Chaffee ( 1986 )-that 
individuals value channels that they believe contain information relevant to 
their specific needs. As we noted above, it seems to matter to people that a 
channel is willing to go beyond simple provision of risk information, by offering 
its users cues for evaluating that information. This may help explain why 
interpersonal channels are perceived as far more useful to personal risk judgments 
than mediated ones, as interactivity encourages the assumption of information 
specificity. Many risk communicators have received this message: the N ational 
Cancer lnstitute, by way of example, offers a rich array of opportunities for 
individuals to interact with cancer information specialists by telephone, online 
chat, or email (http://www.cancer.gov/global/contact) . 
Still, there is still much ro leam about factors that may influence channel 
choices. Griffin et al. ( 2013) suggest that informational subjective norms m ay be 
more important players in channel selection than previously assumed. Since 
purposive, systematic information seeking is uncommon, even in the face of a risky 
situation, individuals may face considerable ambiguity in deciding where and how 
to seek. That, in tum, may lead them ro use rhe channel choices of others as guides. 
Recent work in political science on 'motivated reasoning' augments our 
discussion of the importance of understanding motivators of information seeking. 
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In a recent study, Nir (2011) explored the extent to which information seeking 
and processing, in the political arena, were driven by two dimensions: accuracy 
goals (i.e., an effort to reach correct conclusions); or direccional goals (i.e., an 
effort to reach and then reinforce preferred conclusions). As we noted earlier in 
the chapter, both goals do motiva te risk information seeking. A decision to avoid 
learning more about a risk is a good example, as such behavior has little to do 
with constructing an accurate understanding of a risk, and much to do with 
minimizing one's exposure to potentially threatening information; that is, 
reinforcing a kind of protective ignorance of possible outcomes. Many risks carry 
political baggage ( the risks associated with global warming offer an iconic 
example), and studies of the ways in which motivated reasoning influences 
information seeking may be of particular value in those contested domains. 
Finally, we reinforce our earlier call for more studies of information seeking 
that allow channel beliefs to interact with other possible predictors, such as 
informational self,efficacy anda variety of motiva tions; in particular, informational 
subjective norms. Risk informar ion seeking will emerge ( or not) from combinations 
of these factors, and both scholars and risk practitioners must be prepared to look 
at that fuller picture. It is only in that highly nuanced landscape, we suspect, that 
one will find that long,sought good fit between message and behavior. 
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